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Abstract
In this paper we provide a survey of the optimum currency area theory, estimate the degree of
the explanatory power of the optimum currency area criteria, and also calculate the optimum
currency area index in the case of the Czech Republic. The results indicate that the traditional
optimum currency area criteria to certain extent explain exchange rate variability. Our results
may be interpreted as an attempt to assess the benefit-cost ratio of implementing a common
currency for a pair of countries. Our results also suggest that from the point of view of the
optimum currency area theory the costs of adopting the euro for the Czech Republic may be
relatively low, at least in comparison with other EMU member countries. We conclude that if
the European Monetary Union is sustainable, the accession of the Czech Republic should not
change it.
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Nontechnical Summary
The exchange rate policies of the EU candidate countries, and the ERM2, in particular its
effectiveness and wisdom, have been subject to a heated debate ever since the prospects of
eurozone accession appeared. This discussion intensified in 2002 after statements made by several
accession countries about “as-soon-as-possible” adoption of the euro.
We discuss exchange rate management from the point of view of the optimum currency area
(OCA) theory, focusing on the case study of the Czech Republic. Since all candidate countries are
expected sooner or later to fix their national currencies within the Eurosystem in, we employ
“standard” OCA criteria in order to assess whether the theory suggests a case for locking the
koruna into the eurozone. We operationalise the optimum currency area theory in connection with
the EMU and Czech Republic. This theory tries to answer an almost prohibitively difficult
question: what is the optimal number of currencies to be used in one region, or, alternatively, what
is the optimal area in which one currency should be maintained. The difficulty of the question
leads to low operational precision of OCA theory. Therefore, we argue that OCA theory is a
framework for discussion about monetary integration.
Despite this difficulty, we assess the costs and benefits of euro adoption in the Czech Republic.
The results suggest that the costs of adopting the common currency are comparable to the EU
“peripheral” countries from the viewpoint of OCA theory, because there is sufficient trade
integration, openness, symmetry of shocks and structural similarity of exports between the Czech
economy and the EU. We conclude in this issue that if the eurozone is sustainable, the accession
of the Czech economy should not change it. In other words, the costs of adopting the euro in the
Czech Republic should be comparable to those costs within the eurozone countries.
By a slightly different method we compare the structural similarity of the Czech Republic and
Portugal to the German economy and find that the Czech economy is closer. The results are
reversed when the EU economy is considered as the benchmark country.
We turn our attention to eurozone, too. We do not find any striking difference between the so-
called core of the EU (e.g. Germany and the Benelux countries) and the periphery (e.g. Portugal).
We estimate a ranking of the European economies that are suitable for forming a monetary union
between each other and find that the ranking stayed the same in the 1980s and in the 1990s.
Our empirical estimations show that the OCA criteria (e.g. symmetry of shocks and trade
integration) explain exchange rate variability to a certain extent. We also provide the following
short surveys: recent monetary integration processes around the world; monetary unions outside
Europe; OCA theory; OCA studies relating to transition economies; and OCA studies relating to
the Czech Republic.Optimum Currency Area Indices – How Close is the Czech Republic to the Eurozone?   3
1.  Introduction – Optimum Currency Area Theory
This paper deals mainly with the calculation of optimum currency area (OCA) indices for
industrial countries in an effort to estimate the cost-benefit ratio of adopting a common currency.
We present the opinion that OCA theory has very limited scope in providing robust conclusions
for policy makers on exchange rate issues in the run-up to eurozone accession. Moreover, we
provide a short review of recent monetary integration processes, as well as a review of the
optimum currency area theory.
The analysis concentrates on the wider perspective of the benefits and costs of the common
currency, i.e. where the final goal of the candidate countries’ exchange rate strategies should be.
This means we assume by definition that no single country fulfils completely the attributes to
make it an optimal member of a monetary union.
The optimum currency area (OCA) theory arose from debates about exchange rate regimes and
adjustment under balance of payments disequilibria. Mundell (1961) in his seminal work on OCA
theory challenged Friedman’s (1953) view on the floating exchange rate regime as means of
adjustment under balance of payments disequilibria due to exogenous shocks. Mundell (1961) in
his model of an asymmetric shift in demand between two countries stressed that the optimum
currency area can differ from the actual currency area. Such a difference could cause an inability
of the floating exchange rate regime to cushion the shock and bring the countries back to
equilibrium. That is why Mundell (1961) offered some non-exchange rate means of adjustment,
such as labour mobility, nominal flexibility and fiscal transfers. Later, Ingram (in Kawai, 1987),
McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969) extended the list of non-exchange rate means of adjustment
by considering financial integration, openness and national product diversification.
1
According to McKinnon (2000), Mundell presents a neo-Keynesian model, still in the belief that it
is possible to eliminate the effect of shocks by national monetary and fiscal policies. There is also
another neo-Keynesian relic: Mundell’s implicit assumption of a downward-sloping and stable
Phillips curve.
However, there are two other later articles by Mundell (1973a, 1973b) which present a completely
different argumentation concerning the optimum currency area. This is his monetarist view on the
subject: if countries can adopt a common currency without a substantial change in their
purchasing parities, then they gain better allocation of capital, since they will get rid of the
uncertainty in their exchange rates. Foreign reserves will have to increase less than proportionally
with the size of the economy. Then, under asymmetric shocks in countries with a common
currency, there will not be a decline in output, because the costs of absorbing the shocks will be
effectively spread over time. The existence of two Mundell models – early and recent – explains
why he is heavily quoted both by the proponents and by the sceptics of the Economic and
Monetary Union.
                                                          
1 This search for optimum currency area characteristics is not exhausted by these examples. For a survey, see
Horváth (2001) or Horváth and Komárek (2002a,b).4   Luboš Komárek, Zdeněk Čech, Roman Horváth
Moreover, there is a relevant question – in this context – of how much trade integration matters.
There are at least two views on this issue. First, countries can benefit from greater trade
integration, because it leads to more effective allocation of resources. With greater trade
integration there will be further synchronisation of national business cycles, as trade among
European countries is typically intra-industry trade based on economies of scale and imperfect
competition. Thus, it will not lead to greater specialisation and – above all – it will not lead to a
higher probability of asymmetric shock occurrence.
Proponents of the second view
2 argue that greater trade integration will lead to higher
specialisation. Because of economies of scale, greater integration will lead to regional
concentration of industrial activity. Thus, asymmetric shocks are more likely to occur in the future
(since output is less diversified), and this will bring extra costs to the monetary union.
Frankel and Rose (1998a,b) show that the greater the trade integration, the higher the correlation
of business cycles among countries. Furthermore, they emphasise that business cycles and trade
integration are interrelated and endogenous processes to establishing a currency union. Thus, they
demonstrate that countries may fulfil the OCA criteria ex post, even though they did not fulfil
them ex ante. Monetary union entry increases trade linkages among the countries, and this causes
the business cycle to be more symmetric among the participants of the union.
3 The arguments of
Frankel and Rose (1998a,b) lead to a conclusion that the costs of implementing a common
currency are relatively low. However, there are some doubts about the validity of the endogenous
OCA criteria. In a theoretical model Hallett and Piscitelli (2001) show that the validity of the
endogenous OCA hypothesis is uncertain and dependent to a large extent on structural
convergence in the beginning phase of the monetary union. Without sufficient structural
convergence, implementing the common currency would cause greater divergence.
Maybe a more interesting question is not the search for the optimal exchange rate regime, but the
search for the optimal variability of the exchange rate. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997a,b and
1998) suggest an approach for modelling exchange rate variability which takes into account
multiple interdependency of the economies. The empirical part of this paper follows on from
Bayoumi and Eichengreen. Thus, the purpose of this part is to estimate the degree to which
exchange rate variability may be explained by the traditional OCA criteria, as defined in the
classical OCA literature in the 1960s. Also, we attempt to determine “OCA indices”, which for
given pairs of countries assess the benefit-cost ratio of adopting a common currency.
                                                          
2 Krugman (1993). De Grauwe (1997) discusses the limitations of Krugman’s view. He shows that Krugman
assumes that the regional concentration of industry will not cross the borders of the member countries, while
borders will be less relevant in influencing the shape of these concentration effects. If so, then asymmetric
shocks will not be country specific and the floating exchange rate cannot be used to deal with asymmetric shocks
anyway. In addition, there will be trade creation among the monetary union countries.
3 According to Fidrmuc (2001), the intensity of intra-industry trade is another variable with a positive impact on
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2. A Survey of Regional Monetary Unions
Regional currency areas have various roots, such as historical, “existential”, economic and,
especially, political. The importance of political factors can be found, for instance, in the process
of creating an independent Germany in 1871 (as well as in 1990, when the eastern and western
parts of Germany were unified) and many other states (e.g. Switzerland and Italy). Existential
reasons are characteristic of geographically small countries (such as El Salvador, Kiribati,
Liechtenstein, Monaco, Nauru and the Vatican), where the acceptance and legalisation of a
foreign trading partner’s currency were a necessity. For the sake of completeness, there are also
states where more than one currency circulates within their borders. These include Hong Kong
and Macao.
The best known and economically strongest currency area is certainly the eurozone, which was
founded in cashless form in 1999.
4 Table 2.1 provides a survey of other, non-European regional
monetary unions.
Table 2.1: Monetary Unions Outside Europe
MONETARY UNION CURRENCY CENTRAL BANK
Eastern Caribbean
Currency Area (1950)
Eastern Caribbean dollar (pegged









Franc de la cooperation financière
en Afrique centrale (pegged
formerly to FRF and now to EUR)
(i)
Banque des Etats de l’Afrique
West Africa Economic and
Monetary Union (1945)
Franc de la communauté
financière d’Afrique (pegged
formerly to FRF and now to EUR)
(ii)
Banque Centrale des Etats de
l’Afrique de l’Ouest
Note: (i) and (ii) are commonly called the CFA Franc.
Table 2.2 shows the main directions and discussions in the terms of existence, enlargement and
creation of monetary unions. Potential monetary integration processes are being considered on
every continent. Masson and Patillo (2001) discuss the integration efforts in West Africa in the
countries of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), which should introduce a
common currency in the near future (probably in 2004).
                                                          
4 Cash was introduced on 1 January 2002. Generally, it is possible to introduce a common currency in cash and
cashless form simultaneously, but it is impossible to introduce cash before cashless transactions.6   Luboš Komárek, Zdeněk Čech, Roman Horváth








Current eurozone (12) +
countries outside eurozone (3)
+ candidate countries (10)
 (i)
http://europa.eu.int
EAST AFRICA Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda
Signed a treaty (in 1999) forming an
economic bloc and monetary union, which
revives their former currency union.
Mkenda (2001).
WEST AFRICA
Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS: i.e.
Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea-
Bissau, Mali, Niger, Cote
d’Ivoire , Senegal and Togo) +
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,
Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra
Leone
Declared (in April 2000) the intention to
form a broader monetary union. Monetary
union of ECOWAS countries would be
created in 2004. Masson and Pattilo (2001).
ARABIAN GULF
Gulf Co-operation Council
(Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman,
Saudi Arabia and United Arab
Emirates)
Announced (in early 2002) a plan for a
customs union by 2003 and a common
currency by 2010. New currency, possibly to
be called the Gulf dinnar, will be established








Leaders of ASEAN endorsed (in December
1988) a project to study the feasibility of






Australia and New Zealand, or
adoption of Australian dollar by
New Zealand 
(ii)
Coleman (2001) provides a discussion of the




Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay)
+ associate members (Bolivia
and Chile)
Two strategies discussed: (i) adoption of
USD as common currency, or (ii) creation of
regional “Mercosur” currency. Currently,
due to the crisis in Argentina, this project is
oriented more towards the medium term.
NORTH
AMERICA
NAFTA (Canada, Mexico and
USA)
Given the high proportion of Canadian and
Mexican trade with the USA, a NAFTA
dollar, or “Amero”, has been proposed by
Grubel (1999).
Note: (i) 10 countries are officially termed the “accession countries”, i.e. Cyprus, Malta, the Czech
Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria,
Romania and Turkey); (ii) The Australian economy is roughly seven times bigger than that
of New Zealand.
Source: See the right column of Table 2.2.Optimum Currency Area Indices – How Close is the Czech Republic to the Eurozone?   7
3. OCA Theory and the Eurozone
In connection with European integration, dozens of studies have appeared attempting to assess the
costs and benefits of adopting a common currency in Europe from the point of view of OCA
theory.
5 Most of the empirical studies
6 focus on four relationships among the members of the
potential monetary union, testing the characteristics of the OCA. They are: the degree of labour
mobility, the system of fiscal transfers, the extent of trade, and the similarity of shocks and
business cycles. These four characteristics are interrelated, which makes econometric testing
difficult.
3.1 Ex Post Even if Not Ex Ante?
Based on empirical findings using the instrumental variables method,
7 Frankel and Rose (1998a,
1998b) argue that the greater the trade integration the higher the correlation of business cycles
among countries. Furthermore, Frankel and Rose (1998a, 1998b) argue that business cycles and
trade integration are interrelated and endogenous processes to establishing a currency union. Thus,
Frankel and Rose (1998a) note that countries may fulfil the OCA criteria ex post, even though
they did not fulfil them ex ante. Eurozone entry increases trade linkages among countries, and this
causes the business cycle to be more symmetric among the participants of the union. Frankel and
Rose (1998a) also note that because countries link their currencies to their most important trading
partners in order to keep their exchange rates stable, they lose a certain amount of monetary
policy independence.
Fidrmuc (2001) shows that the intensity of intra-industry trade is another variable that has a
positive impact on the synchronisation of business cycles.
3.2 Methodological Problems of Measurement
The discussion on the eurozone could not come to a clear conclusion before the creation of the
eurozone. This is partly because we are forced to use various proxies that are interrelated and
inaccurate. For example, in our attempts to measure symmetry of shocks, we would like to know
whether we are facing demand or supply shocks and whether the shocks are transitory or
persistent. Another caveat is how to distinguish between shocks and the reactions to them.
8
Economies might face identical shocks, but the transmission would differ, and in measuring the
correlation of business cycles we could obtain a correlation close to zero. By contrast, it can be
argued that the difference in the speed of the transmission is caused by differences in labour
market institutions or by rigidity.
It is also very important to consider the possibly high transaction costs and, of course, political
issues, both of which can seriously reduce the attractiveness of a currency union. Owing to these
high transaction costs, markets may come to view the currency union as unsuccessful. The
                                                          
5 Previously, there had been almost no empirical research done on OCA theory.
6 See Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1996a) and Schelke (2001) for surveys.
7 See Rodrick (2000) for a critique of the econometric methods used by Frankel and Rose (1998a, 1998b).
8 Again, the Lucas critique could shed some light on this.8   Luboš Komárek, Zdeněk Čech, Roman Horváth
emerging lack of credibility because of the change in the expectations of the markets could be
self-fulfilling and cause the break-up of the monetary union.
Empirical studies are only able to estimate the probability of the asymmetric shock (or other OCA
criteria can be considered). Such results are also incomparable with existing monetary unions (the
USA), because of the endogeneity of the OCA criteria. In other words there may be a further
boost in convergence among the countries adopting a common currency.
3.3 Other Empirical Findings
To our knowledge, there are no serious studies providing a clear answer to the adoption of the
common currency. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) find a relatively high symmetry of shocks in
the “core” of the EU
9 and a lower one for other western European countries, using the VAR
approach. Applying different techniques, the difference between the core and periphery of the EU
is smaller or even vanishes. Schelke (2001) argues that the first stream of OCA theory (1960s) is
not appropriate for explaining economic phenomena.
Nevertheless, there seems to be a general understanding that the probability of asymmetric shocks
is higher in the eurozone than in the USA (meaning that the costs of the common currency are
higher), but for some eurozone countries the probability of asymmetric shocks may be close to
that for the USA.
10 A striking difference between the eurozone and the USA can be seen in their
adjustment to shocks such as the degree of labour mobility
11 or rigidity of prices. It can be
expected for the eurozone that there will be a need for coordination of fiscal policies as a means of
absorbing their potential asymmetric shocks.
4. OCA Theory and the Czech Republic
4.1 The Relevance of OCA Theory to Exchange Rate Regimes
OCA theory attempts to give an answer to the choice of regime based on the structural
characteristics of the economy (notice that OCA theory only distinguishes between pure float and
pure fixed, which is not often the case for economic policy makers
12). Turning to the application
of OCA theory to the Czech Republic in the 1990s, Horváth and Jonáš (1998) show that the Czech
Republic faced strong asymmetric shocks with Germany at the beginning of the 1990s and that
OCA theory would suggest that the right choice is a floating exchange rate. Also, there was strong
                                                          
9 Austria, Benelux, Denmark, France, Germany and Switzerland (this country is of course not a member of EU;
see Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) for argumentation on why Switzerland was included in the sample).
10 Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2001) argue that the extent of asymmetric shocks declined in the EU economies
during the 1990s.
11 See Obstfeld and Peri (1998) for a comprehensive discussion and empirical comparison between the EU and
the USA.
12 Willett and Wihlborg (1999) suggest considering other exchange rate regimes for further research.Optimum Currency Area Indices – How Close is the Czech Republic to the Eurozone?   9
dissimilarity in inflation rates between the Czech Republic and its trading partners, which would
undermine Czech competitiveness under a fixed exchange rate regime in the long run.
13
On the other hand, the Czech economy’s low financial integration with its western European
trading partners and its relatively high openness is an argument for fixing the currency in order to
eliminate potentially high volatility in the financial markets. As a result, we can see that OCA
theory does not have operational precision for decision-making in the short term and that it is a
long-run theory. Goldberg (1999) argues that OCA theory is less suitable for transition
economies, owing to some specific stabilisation and transition problems. Often, when studying
transition economies, one has to take into account their specific characteristics due to stabilisation
and institutional aspects.
Nevertheless, even if OCA theory is not operationally precise, we can monitor the OCA criteria
over time, as was done by Cincibuch and Vávra (2001), who find strong convergence of the
Czech OCA criteria to Germany and the EU.
14 In particular, Cincibuch and Vávra (2001)
construct an “OCA index”
15 predicting the variability of the nominal exchange rate for the Czech
Republic using a regression equation estimated by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1998a). The
estimation yielded the following for the 1983–1992 data
16 (with standard errors in parentheses):
     SD(eij)= - 0.09 + 1.46SD(∆yi-∆yj) + 0.022DISSIMij - 0.054TRADEij + 0.012SIZEij     (1)
                    (0.02)           (0.21)                  (0.006)              (0.006)               (0.001)
n = 210    R
2 = 0.51   S.E.=0.027
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1998a) suggest how to calculate the relevant variables. SD(eij) is the
standard deviation of the change in the logarithm of the end-year bilateral exchange rate
17
between countries i and j, SD(∆yi-∆yj) is the standard deviation of the difference in the logarithm
of real output between i and j, DISSIMij is the sum of the absolute differences in the shares of
agricultural, mineral and manufacturing trade in total merchandise trade, TRADEij is the mean of
the ratio of bilateral exports to domestic GDP for the two countries, and SIZEij is the mean of the
logarithm of the two GDPs measured in U.S. dollars. These four variables represent the basic
OCA criteria, and it is believed that the lower the volatility of exchange rates is among countries,
the better prepared they are to join the monetary union.
18
Cincibuch and Vávra (2001) show that the Czech Republic achieved a higher degree of structural
convergence to Germany than Portugal or Greece during the 1990s. However, one problem with
this analysis is that the equation is assumed to be stable over time. The original regression
                                                          
13 In the short run there may be some credibility gains from fixing exchange rates for a higher inflation country.
14 The variables considered were: correlation of business cycles, trade linkages, difference in the commodity
structure of bilateral exports, and size of the economies
15 For the OCA index for Slovakia, see the National Bank of Slovakia website, but notice that some results have
to be interpreted very carefully, since they measure, for example, the correlation of business cycles on data for
1997–1998.
16 The countries included in the regression are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, the United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the USA.
17 Nominal exchange rate.
18 For a broader description of the regression and the computation of the OCA index, see section 5.1.10   Luboš Komárek, Zdeněk Čech, Roman Horváth
equation used data for 1983–1992. There were financial crises in Western Europe in 1992–1993
and financial flows were much more important in the 1990s than in the 1980s. These facts could
strongly influence the stability of the equation. Another problem could arise from the fact that
there are several non-European industrial economies included in the sample, namely Australia,
Canada, Japan, New Zealand and the USA.
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997a) also estimated the regression with European economies only,
in the same way as described above, and the regression was to a certain extent different.
19 They
present regressions for the variability of real exchange rates, too.
Table 4.1: OCA Index, Structural Similarity with Germany
Exchange rate
variability Nominal Real Nominal Real Nominal Nominal
Data/Country Europe Europe World World World World
Czech Republic 0.022 0.071 0.193 0.194 0.023 0.035
Austria 0.006 0.057 0.185 0.187 0.003 0.008
Portugal 0.022 0.072 0.201 0.202 0.029 0.062
Source: Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997a, 1998a), Cincibuch and Vávra (2001), own calculations.
We can compare the results of Cincibuch and Vávra (2001) with the other four regression
equations estimated by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997a, 1998a).
20 We present the results for the
data from 1993 to 1998 in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. The structural convergence of Austria, the Czech
Republic and Portugal with Germany as the benchmark country is shown in Table 4.1, while the
EU is considered as the benchmark country in Table 4.2. We chose Austria, the Czech Republic
and Portugal because they represent examples of a converged (or core), transition and peripheral
economy respectively.
21
Except for the last column, the results are the calculation of the authors. The first line indicates
whether we are considering the variability of the nominal or real exchange rate. The second line
indicates whether we are dealing with the sample of European economies or all industrial
economies. The results are of Cincibuch and Vávra (2001) for the Czech Republic using data from
1993 to 1998 and the forecast of Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1998a) using the data for 1971–1987
to the year 1995 in the last column. The results are not fully comparable across the columns.
As can be seen in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, the OCA index for Austria is much lower than those for the
other two economies. The results for the Czech Republic and Portugal look quite similar. The
Czech Republic has a lower OCA index than Portugal when Germany is considered as the
benchmark country; the opposite is true when the EU is the benchmark country.
                                                          
19 See the Appendix for a comparison.
20 Variability of nominal exchange rates and variability of real exchange rates with European economies only,
and the same when some other non-European industrial countries are included. This means the sample consisted
of 16 European economies (which is what we mean by Europe in Tables 4.1 and 4.2) or 16 European economies
plus 5 non-European economies (which is what we mean by World in Tables 4.1 and 4.2).
21 We cannot report the results for Greece (as is done by Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1998a), since the data
needed to calculate variable DISSIM were impossible to obtain.Optimum Currency Area Indices – How Close is the Czech Republic to the Eurozone?   11




Nominal Real Nominal Real Nominal Nominal
Data/Country Europe Europe World World World World
Czech Republic 0.0203 0.073 0.205 0.206 0.025 0.034
Austria 0.0035 0.056 0.191 0.194 0.003 -----
Portugal 0.0127 0.065 0.198 0.199 0.014 -----
Source: Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997a, 1998a), Cincibuch and Vávra (2000), own calculations.
4.2 Empirical Studies on OCA Theory and Transition Economies
Other empirical studies,
23 such as Boone and Maurel (1998), Horváth (2001), Fidrmuc and
Korhonen (2001) and Schweickert (2001), focus not only on the Czech Republic, but also on
other transition economies.
They show that the structural convergence of the Czech Republic does not differ considerably
from the convergence of other Central European countries. But a difference can be seen between
the Czech Republic on the one hand, and Romania and Bulgaria on the other.
Schweickert (2001) compares transition economies with a reference group (Greece, Portugal and
Spain) using a “comparative indicator”, where he tries to capture the Maastricht criteria,
institutional development, the development of capital markets, and the OCA criteria. Schweickert
(2001) shows that adopting the euro will bring more net benefits to the transition economies than
to the reference group from the point of view of OCA theory. On the other hand, the transition
economies were doing worse than the reference group when compared by the other indicators.
Boone and Maurel (1998) show that a large part of the output variability of the transition
economies can be explained by variation in German output or EU output, and that reactions to the
changes in output are positively correlated.
Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2001) find a much lower correlation between the Czech business cycle
and the EU’s cycle than the correlation between the Hungarian or Estonian business cycles and
the EU’s.
Horváth (2002) in his empirical study argues that shocks between the transition economies and the
EU are, to a large extent, still idiosyncratic (correlation of demand or supply shocks between the
transition economies and the four biggest European countries is rather exceptional). As a result,
the adoption of the common currency may be relatively costly. Hornikova (2003) further supports
these results by showing the low correlation of shocks between the Czech economy and the
eurozone.
                                                          
22 Since DISSIM for the EU is unknown, at least as far as we know (and Cincibuch and Vávra, 2001, say the
same), we took Germany’s DISSIM as a proxy.
23 The problem with all empirical studies dealing with business cycles is short time series.12   Luboš Komárek, Zdeněk Čech, Roman Horváth
Empirical analyses do not come to a definite conclusion concerning the structural convergence of
the transition economies to the EU/eurozone from the point of view of OCA theory (the best
performers are usually Slovenia, Hungary, Estonia and the Czech Republic). Fidrmuc (2001)
argues that the most important roles in convergence are played by the intensity of intra-industry
trade, foreign direct investment, and the commodity and geographical structure of exports.
5. Measuring OCA Indices in Europe
In this section we elaborate the analysis of section 4.1. Since assuming stability of the regression
equation (1) over time might be restrictive, we recalculate equation (1) for newer data than those
used by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997a,b and 1998). Then our analysis proceeds in a similar
way, in an attempt to assess the cost-benefit ratio for adopting the common currency. We focus on
the Czech Republic, but the argumentation can be generalised to the other transitional countries as
well.
5.1 Methodology
Countries experiencing symmetric shocks or high trade linkages tend to have stable exchange
rates. In other words, the more the OCA criteria are fulfilled among the countries, the lower
should be the exchange rate variability among them. Under this assumption we estimate the
equation:
SD(eij) = a + b1SD(∆yi-∆yj) + b2DISSIMij + b3TRADEij + b4SIZEij         (2)
SD(eij) measures the volatility of bilateral nominal exchange rates, SD(∆yi-∆yj) captures the
asymmetric shocks at national level, TRADEij is the proxy for the intensity of trade linkages,
DISSIMij assesses the asymmetric shocks at industrial level, and SIZEij measures the size of the
economy and assesses utility from maintaining the national currency.
24
The proxies are computed as follows: SD(eij) is the standard deviation of the change in the
logarithm of the bilateral exchange rate between countries i and j on a monthly basis, SD(∆yi-∆yj)
is the standard deviation of the difference in the logarithm of real output between i and j, DISSIMij
is the sum of the absolute differences in the shares of agricultural, mineral and manufacturing
trade in total merchandise trade, TRADEij is the mean of the ratio of bilateral exports to domestic
GDP for the given two countries, and SIZEij is the mean of the logarithm of the two GDPs
measured in U.S. dollars.
The data sample contains 21 industrial countries for the period from 1989 to 1998. These are
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the United Kingdom,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
                                                          
24 The lower the size, the lower the relative utility of maintaining the national currency. SIZEij can possibly
capture the effect of adjustment costs, too. The bigger the countries are in economic terms, the higher the costs
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Switzerland and the USA. For convenience we label these data as representing the 1990s. When
calculating variable SD(eij) we used the data from the IFS (IMF); the data for SD(∆yi-∆yj) were
calculated from the World Bank; TRADEij was calculated using data from Directions of Trade
(IMF and World Bank); variable DISSIMij was calculated with the use of data from the Monthly
Statistics of Foreign Trade (OECD); and SIZEij was computed from World Bank data. When
putting together the data matrix, we follow the advice of Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997a,b and
1998). This allows us to compare the results for different time periods.
Since we are interested in whether exchange rate variability can be explained by the traditional
OCA criteria, we consider the variables with a cross-border impact in all the equations. Bayoumi
and Eichengreen (1997a,b and 1998) find little evidence that a more open economy tends to fix its
currency. But since openness is also one of the traditional OCA criteria, we include a proxy for
openness, too.
25 This means that we estimate the following equation:
SD(eij) = a + b1SD(∆yi-∆yj) + b2DISSIMij + b3TRADEij + b4OPENij       (3).
The analysis takes into account all the relationships between each of the economies. There is a
pair of countries in each row of the data matrix. Given 20 countries, we obtain 190 observations.
26
The expected signs of the explanatory variables are as follows: the exchange rate volatility is
expected to depend positively on the business cycle and on the dissimilarity in the commodity
structure of exports, and negatively on the trade linkages. The expected sign of openness is
theoretically indeterminate.
27
We are aware that there is a possibility that the independent variable influences the dependent
variable, i.e. there is a potential influence of exchange rate variability on growth or the volume of
trade. However, taking the standard deviation of output and the volume of bilateral trade
considerably reduces this influence.
5.2 Results
We begin by exploring some basic descriptive characteristics of the data set. As we can see in
Table 5.1, there is a tendency towards increasing volatility in the exchange rate data. The low
variability in the 1960s was due to the Bretton-Woods system, while the higher volatility in the
1970s was maybe the consequence of the failure of Bretton-Woods and the oil shocks. In the
1980s there was a slow return to equilibrium and exchange rate variability was again declining.
The high volatility of exchange rates in the 1990s was caused by numerous financial crises and,
more generally, by the rising financial flows among the countries and their spillover effects.
However, the variability in the second half of the 1990s is decreasing, quite understandably as a
                                                          
25 The proxy was calculated as the arithmetic mean of the i-th and j-th country’s ratio of trade (export + import)
to its GDP.
26 The relationship of the first country to the second one is the same as that of the second to the first. That is why
the number of observations equals 20!/18!2!. Since the data for the calculation of the variable DISSIM were not
available for Greece (except in 1997), we finally excluded Greece from the analysis. At first, we took the data
for 1997 as an average measure of Greece’s DISSIMij for the period 1989–1998, but tests on the outliers using
studentised residuals showed that many of the observations for Greece were outliers even at a p-value lower than
0.01. It is uncertain whether this was due to the lack of data or to some other reason.
27 See Isard (1995).14   Luboš Komárek, Zdeněk Čech, Roman Horváth
consequence of the institutional arrangements of the EU
28 and the progress with EU monetary
integration. This conclusion is supported by both the monthly and yearly data, as depicted in
Tables 5.1 and 5.2.








Note: “Volatility” in this table means the average of the standard deviations of the change in the
logarithm of the bilateral exchange rate, based on yearly data.





Note: “Volatility” in this table means the average of the standard deviations of the change in the
logarithm of the bilateral exchange rate, based on monthly data.
Very low exchange rate volatility persists in the core EU countries. However, it is difficult to find
criteria which would clearly distinguish the core from the remaining countries, as presented in the
text below. We present the exchange rate variability in Table 5.3.
29
Another concern is symmetry of shocks (variable SD(∆yi-∆yj)), as Table 5.4 depicts. If the
national business cycle were fully synchronised, the value would be zero. Again, the shocks in the
EU core are relatively low, but here the difference between the core and other EU countries is not
so striking as for exchange rate volatility.
One can expect the OCA criteria to explain less of the exchange rate variability in the 1990s than
for example in the 1980s, due to the advances in monetary integration in the EU and also to the
EMS financial crisis in 1992–1993.
                                                          
28See Čech and Komárek (2002a) for a survey of the EU’s institutional arrangements concerning exchange rate
issues.
29 We present in Table 5.3 only the countries having the lowest exchange rate volatility. A full table of all the
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Table 5.3: Exchange Rate Volatility for Selected Countries of the EU in the 1990s
Austria Belgium Germany Denmark Switzerland Ireland
Belgium 0.005
Germany 0.003 0.005
Denmark 0.008 0.006 0.007
Switzerland 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.015
Ireland 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.020
Netherlands 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.008 0.014 0.014
Note: “Volatility” in this table means the standard deviation of the change in the logarithm of the
bilateral exchange rate between countries i and j; based on monthly data.










Note: Symmetry of shocks in this context is measured as the standard deviation of the difference in the
logarithm of real output between countries i and j.
30
The results for trade linkages (TRADEij) are straightforward. Clearly, countries such as Austria,
Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands have strong bilateral trade with each other. The Czech
Republic is also closely tied to Germany by trade. However, the dissimilarity of exports
(DISSIMij) of the countries presented in Table 5.5 is around the European average. The trade
linkages of the Czech economy with other EU countries are not as strong as with Germany. For
example, the value for another geographical neighbour – Austria – is 0.016, just over twice the
European average.
The descriptive statistics results for the Czech Republic are evidence of strong linkages with
Germany, and one may put forward the view that its economy should not encounter difficult
problems when adopting euro. However, as shown in section 4.1, the results can be slightly
different when the whole of the EU, instead of Germany, is considered as the benchmark. We
compared the structural similarity of the Czech Republic and Portugal to the German economy
and found that the Czech economy is closer. The results are reversed when the EU economy is
taken as the benchmark country.
                                                          
30 Ireland has relatively high asymmetric shocks with most of the EU countries. For example, the asymmetry of
the shocks with Germany was one of the highest in our data sample, at 0.1311. This is partially caused by the
high growth rates in Ireland. The shocks of the Czech Republic with Germany are below the European average,
with a value of 0.0298. The European average was 0.046. However, the asymmetry of shocks between the Czech
Republic and Austria is very high, at 0.1344 being roughly three times the European average.16   Luboš Komárek, Zdeněk Čech, Roman Horváth
Table 5.5: Trade Linkages and Dissimilarity of Exports for Selected Countries
AB
Belgium Netherlands 0.0689 0.287
Belgium Germany 0.0687 0.129




Belgium France 0.0646 0.078
Austria Germany 0.0529 0.052
Germany Ireland 0.0426 0.304
Average in EU 0.007 0.293
Notes:  A - the mean of the ratio of bilateral exports to domestic GDP for the given two countries
B - the sum of the absolute differences in the shares of agricultural, mineral and
manufacturing trade in total merchandise trade.
The estimation of equation (2) yields the following:
Table 5.6: Results of Estimation of Equation (2)
Coefficient t-statistic
Variability of output 0.089 2.7
Trade ratio -0.121 -5.6
Size of economy 0.016 4.15
Dissimilarity of exports 0.016 1.9




Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997a) point out that equation (2) has the more significant power the
lower is the government interference in the exchange rate market. The data from the 1960s to the
1980s support their hypothesis. Our estimation does not contradict this hypothesis either. All
variables are jointly significantly different from zero, suggesting that the OCA criteria do explain
some of the variability of exchange rates.
Table 5.7: Results of Estimation of Equation (3)
Coefficient t-statistic
Variability of output 0.0369 1.25
Trade ratio -0.023 -6.23
Openness -0.0002 -7.54
Dissimilarity of exports 0.0052 3.67
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As the last step we include the proxy for openness. The results of the estimation of equation (3)
are in Table 5.7. Contrary to the estimations of Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997a,b), this variable
is significant and explains a large degree of the exchange rate variability, suggesting that more
open economies tended to fix their currencies more in the 1990s. It seems that openness is better
proxy for explaining the exchange rate volatility in the 1990s by the traditional OCA criteria
measured by R
2 or by the joint significance of the variables rather than the size of the economy.
Also, R
2 increased from 0.41 to 0.44.
From the above regression equations we calculate the OCA index, which is the predicted value of
exchange rate variability.
31 The lower is the OCA index, the higher is the benefit-cost ratio for
monetary integration for the country pair. The resulting ranking of the economies, as well as the
joint significance and the satisfactorily high R
2 of all of the regressions, strongly supports the idea
that OCA indices have some explanatory power.
All our estimations can be compared with the earlier rankings of Bayoumi and Eichengreen
(1997a) on the data from 1960s to 1980s reported in Table 1 of the Appendix for 21 industrial
countries.
















Note: The OCA index represents the predicted value obtained from estimating equation (3).
It is interesting to have a look at the OCA indices for the recent eurozone members. The eurozone
countries are closer to each other than to the other industrial countries. We present OCA indices
calculated using the estimation results from Table 5.7, i.e. from estimation of equation (3),
because this provides the highest F-statistic. The OCA indices resulting from the other tables, i.e.
from estimation of equation (2), differ to only a small extent and are therefore not reported. The
exception was the OCA index for Australia with New Zealand, which was very sensitive to the
inclusion of the variable OPENij. These two countries are relatively closed, which may explain
why their OCA index is at the average level. Using variable SIZEij, instead of variable OPENij
                                                          
31 If the difference in the economic size of the particular countries is huge, then our underlying assumption of
independent exchange rate policy might be problematic to some extent.18   Luboš Komárek, Zdeněk Čech, Roman Horváth
changes (lowers) the OCA index for Australia and New Zealand, suggesting relatively low costs
for implementing a common currency from the point of view of OCA theory.
We present the OCA indices versus Germany since obviously we need a metric, and Germany is
the most straightforward one. The data available for the Czech Republic are only for the period
1993–1998. The applicability of OCA theory in the early stages of transition, e.g. in 1990–1992,
is rather low, since there are specific transitional problems which are not considered in OCA
theory. See Goldberg (1999), Horváth and Jonáš (1998), Horváth and Komárek (2002), and
Schweickert (2001) for a discussion of the specificity of the transition processes concerning OCA
theory. However, the inclusion of the Czech Republic in the data sample changed the estimations
minimally.










Austria Czech Republic 0.024
Average of the sample 0.025
Note: The OCA index represents the predicted value obtained from estimating equation (3).
There is a significant difference between the values of the OCA indices for Austria, Belgium,
Germany and Netherlands and the other European countries. The value of their OCA indices was
often less than one standard error for the regression and clearly there are no doubts about the
beneficial consequences of adopting the common currency from the point of view of the structural
characteristics of these economies. The resulting OCA indices for Ireland with these economies
are also relatively low, reflecting the fact of sufficient convergence of the Irish economy. Portugal
does not have high OCA indices with these countries, suggesting that there is no evidence of a
sorting-out of the countries at the core and the periphery.
32 The results for Germany vis-à-vis
France imply that euro adoption may be relatively costly, according to OCA theory. The high
values of the OCA index and the size of the economy for the United Kingdom – not only with
Germany – offer arguments for not joining the eurozone immediately after its creation.
The other results are intuitively appealing, too. The values for Canada vis-à-vis the USA, the UK
vis-à-vis Ireland and Australia vis-à-vis New Zealand are very low, indicating that these country
pairs are structurally very similar, as expected. Considerations of these economies’ adopting a
common currency occur in literature largely in the 1990s. Willett (2001) discusses the option of a
common currency for the USA and Canada, and Grubel (1999) for the NAFTA countries.
Coleman (2001) considers the implementing of a common currency in Australia and New
Zealand. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1996) provide a survey of the operationalising of OCA
                                                          
32 See, for instance, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993). Our finding corresponds to the results of Fidrmuc and
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theory. The most important variables for determining OCA indices are trade linkages and
variability of output, and also openness for very open economies. If we compare the OCA indices
versus Germany from our results with the results of Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997b), we find
that the ranking of the economies has changed little since 1987 (compare Table 5.9 and Table 3 in
the Appendix).
33 This is also true for the OCA indices of the Czech Republic and Portugal with
Germany in the 1990s, as we showed in section 4.1.
The resulting OCA indices for the Czech Republic cannot show that there are substantially bigger
structural differences between the Czech Republic and Germany than between the eurozone
member countries. We can argue that the costs of adopting the euro in the Czech Republic should
be comparable to those costs within the eurozone countries. However, for the decision-making it
is necessary to consider all the accession countries potentially adopting the euro together and not
separately, due to their interdependence and economic size, as our analysis also suggests.
Finally, we provide evidence for the importance of considering the international monetary system.
We include the proxy DOLVARij for the international regime, which captures the influence of the
variability of the U.S. dollar exchange rate on exchange rate volatility in the remaining countries.
The estimated equation then is:
SD(eij)=a+b1SD(∆yi-∆yj)+b2DISSIMij+b3TRADEij+b4SIZEij+b5OPENij+b5DOLVARij   (4)
where DOLVARij is calculated as the arithmetic average of the variability of the U.S. dollar
exchange rates for each country pair. The proxy takes on zero value when the USA is one of the
pair of countries. We expect that the higher the variability of the U.S. exchange rate, the higher
the actual bilateral exchange rate for all the countries in the sample. The results are reported in
Table 5.10. All the variables yield the expected signs and are jointly significantly different from
zero. R
2 is relatively high. Our results correspond to the findings of Bayoumi and Eichengreen
(1997a, p. 201) for the 1960s (the sign was opposite for their estimation for the sample from the
1970s and 1980s).
Table 5.10 – Results of Estimation of Equation (4)
Coefficient t-statistic
Variability of output 0.06 2.00
Trade ratio -0.03 -6.74
Openness -0.0001 -3.86
Size of economy 0.02 2.18
Dissimilarity of exports 0.006 4.08
Variability of U.S. dollar 0.004 5.17




                                                          
33 We cannot compare the OCA index values from 1987 with ours, since we have different data matrices.
However, this is not the case for the ranking of the economies.20   Luboš Komárek, Zdeněk Čech, Roman Horváth
6. Conclusion
In this paper we discuss the relevance of the optimum currency area (OCA) theory to the choice
of exchange rate regime in relation to the Czech Republic and the eurozone. There are several
variables to be considered regarding the choice of exchange rate regime, i.e. symmetry of shocks,
intensity of trade linkages, degree of dissimilarity of exports, and openness of the economy. All
these variables we take into account in the construction and estimation of the “OCA index”. We
follow the approach suggesting that the OCA criteria are to a large extent exogenous rather than
endogenous. Then we calculate OCA indices for industrial countries in an effort to estimate the
benefit-cost ratio of adopting a common currency between two countries and discuss the results
for the Czech Republic. We find no support for the view that the economy of the Czech Republic
could possibly structurally differ any more than the eurozone member countries differ from one
another. We conclude that if the eurozone is sustainable, the accession of the Czech economy
should not change it. In other words, the costs of adopting the euro in the Czech Republic should
be comparable to those costs within the eurozone countries.
Moreover, we focused our attention on the eurozone in a similar way. The results correspond to
the earlier estimation of Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997b) and show that the ranking of the
economies suitable for forming a monetary union stayed the same in the 1980s and in the 1990s.
The economies that were structurally close to each other in the 1980s remain close in the 1990s,
and the opposite is true for structurally different economies. This empirical estimation also
provides no evidence for the views that emphasise the seemingly striking difference between the
core and periphery of the European Union.Optimum Currency Area Indices – How Close is the Czech Republic to the Eurozone?   21
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Appendix
Results of Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997a) for Industrial Countries and for European
Economies
Table 1: Results of Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997a) for Industrial Countries
Results for all countries using OCA variables
1960s 1970s 1980s
Variability Nominal Real Nominal Real Nominal Real
SDY 0.5** 0.45** 0.49** 0.53** 1.46** 1.41**
TRADE(*10
-2) -0.13* -0.14** -0.46** -0.37** -0.54** -0.46**
SIZE(*10
-2) 0.13 0.11 1.7** 1.68** 2.5** 2.53**
DISSIM(*10
-2) 1.03** 0.81** 1.89** 1.93** 2.24** 2.8**
Observations 210 210 210 210 210 210
F-test 6.6** 6.9** 25.5** 25.6* 35.6** 37.6**
R-squared 0.15 0.17 0.4 0.41 0.51 0.54
Source: Bayoumi, Eichengreen (1997a); ** and *  indicate significance at 5% and 1% respectively.
Table 2: Results of Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997a) for European Economies
Results for all countries using OCA variables
1960s 1970s 1980s
Variability Nominal Real Nominal Real Nominal Real
SDY 0.36* 0.37** 0.53* 0.69** 0.75** 0.97**
TRADE(*10
-2) -0.18* -0.17** -0.2** -0.14* -0.26** -0.19**
SIZE(*10
-2) 0.37 0.23 0.32 0.65* 0.31 0.71**
DISSIM(*10
-2) 1.17* 0.91* -2.01 -0.39 -1.3 -1.36*
Observations 210 210 210 210 210 210
F-test 4.6** 3.2* 2.8* 3.2* 4.2* 4.6**
R-squared 0.15 0.22 0.15 0.15 0.27 0.35
Source: Bayoumi, Eichengreen (1997a); ** and *  indicate significance at 5% and 1% respectively.
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